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1
I. INTRODUCTION
Taxes on alcohol are among the oldest in the UK and are still an important
source of tax revenue. In 1992, for example, just prior to the completion of the
Single European Market, revenues from excise duties on alcohol totalled over £5
billion, equivalent to 2 per cent on value added tax or 2.5 pence on income tax.
Recently, the future of this source of revenue has become uncertain with the
relaxation of limits on personal imports of excisable goods by domestic
consumers and the increase in cross-border shopping. In this paper, we
investigate the effect of increased cross-border shopping on the revenue return to
alcohol taxation.
2
A degree of fiscal harmonisation was an important part of the European
Union’s programme to establish a market without internal barriers. As part of
this programme, the Commission specified a set of minimum tax rates to be
applied to alcohol and other taxed goods. The idea of the minimum rate was to
avoid cross- border shopping between high- and low-tax countries driving tax
rates down towards the rate applied in the lowest-tax country and thus leaving
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many member states with taxes lower than they would otherwise wish. Above
these minimum rates, however, variation in tax rates persisted.
Table 1 shows the minimum rates adopted for alcohol and those existing in
member countries on 1 January 1993. The UK had, and still has, one of the
highest sets of alcohol duties in the EU. Such duty differentials contribute
towards higher domestic prices relative to those abroad and, therefore, an
incentive for cross-border shopping.
There are a number of arguments for taxing alcohol more heavily than other
goods, and they can be grouped into two classes. One class relies on instances of
possible market failure. First, individuals may not possess all the necessary
information to make rational decisions about their consumption of alcohol (this
ability may be inversely proportional to their consumption). Second, there are
external social costs associated with alcohol consumption which are not taken
into account when individuals choose how much to consume, including the
social cost to other family members or violent crime. Both would justify raising
taxes on alcohol higher than those applied to other goods.
The second class of arguments stems from the efficient indirect tax literature
and uses special cases of the Ramsey Rule.
3 One such argument is that, in an
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efficient indirect tax system, a marginal increase in taxes should reduce demand
for all goods by the same proportion, and thus (given some simplifying
assumptions) goods should be taxed in inverse proportion to their price
elasticities. The demand for alcohol has usually been thought of as relatively
price-inelastic justifying a relatively high rate of tax. A second argument follows
from the Corlett–Hague result and uses the complementarity between alcohol
consumption and leisure to justify additional taxation.
4
Of course, none of the reasons given above provides a particularly strong
explanation as to why alcohol taxes in the UK should be higher than in most
other EU member states. The UK has traditionally imposed high rates of duty on
alcohol as a matter of fiscal preference, as well as on health grounds. National
preferences over the taxation of different goods act strongly in determining
relative tax rates; the fact that excise duties are higher in the UK than in most
other European countries obviously does not reflect greater negative externalities
of alcohol consumption in the UK, but instead a national preference for raising
tax revenue by means of taxes on alcohol, rather than on food or on children’s
clothing, say, which are subject to VAT in every other EU country.
Cross-border shopping is a problem for high-tax countries such as the UK,
the Irish Republic and Denmark
5 for three reasons. The first is to do with
economic inefficiency. To the extent that consumers’ purchase decisions are
driven by tax differences rather than by underlying differences in producer
prices, cross-border shopping causes an inefficient allocation of resources. The
second reason concerns domestic production and sales. If domestic producers are
not able or willing to sell their product in low-tax countries, cross-border
shopping may mean significant reductions in domestic sales, reduced profits and
job losses. If home producers are able to compete in low-tax countries, this effect
will be mitigated. However, the domestic industry will not be completely
unaffected since additional non-domestic off-licence sales to domestic
consumers will inevitably mean a reduction of domestic on-licence sales, and a
shift in revenue away from licensed sales, as well as a shift from domestic to
non-domestic retailers. Finally, there is the loss of domestic tax revenues.
Reduced domestic expenditure on alcohol will cause a loss of excise duty and
VAT revenue to the domestic exchequer.
There is no mechanism within the EU for setting excise duty rates that would
achieve the maximum revenue yield for the Union as a whole. If there were room
for the UK to co-operate with its European neighbours and receive side
payments through the EU budget to compensate for lost revenue caused by tax
differentials, cross-border shopping might not pose a problem for the domestic
exchequer. At present, however, EU member countries are involved in, at best, a
zero-sum game, and any shift in alcohol spending away from the UK will be
                                                                                                                                   
4 See Corlett and Hague (1953).
5 See London Economics (1994) and FitzGerald, Quinn, Whelan and Williams (1988).Alcohol Taxation and Cross-Border Shopping
97
fully reflected in increased non-domestic revenue and reduced domestic revenue.
HM Customs and Excise estimates the loss of tax revenues due to additional
legitimate cross-border shopping in 1993 at £200 million.
Excise duties, particularly on alcohol, appear to be the government’s
currently preferred method for raising lost tax revenues. This is evident from the
1994 mini- Budget which was designed to replace the revenue shortfall resulting
from the government’s inability to introduce the second phase of VAT on
domestic fuel. In this paper, we focus on the problem of raising tax revenue
through taxes on alcohol which now faces the UK government after the
completion of the Single Market. We argue that the Single Market and the
relaxation of restrictions on personal imports of alcohol have changed the
relationship between tax rates and tax revenues. This will affect the
government’s ability to recoup lost revenues, or raise additional revenues, by
altering the tax rate on alcohol.
We are not concerned with estimating the overall ‘optimal’ level of alcohol
taxes in the sense of a tax structure that maximises some social welfare function
subject to a revenue constraint. While this is naturally interesting to academic
economists, it is of secondary importance to the general policy debate. It is
difficult to think of examples where policy has been guided principally by the
desire to maximise social welfare. It is relatively easy to think of examples of
taxes introduced to raise revenues. Alcohol taxation is one such example. It
should be noted, however, that were it to be the case that cutting tax rates could
increase revenues, then such a tax reform would also be welfare-improving.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section II, we present a simple model
of the relationship between tax rates, tax revenues and the price elasticity of
demand. We then discuss the likely effect of the Single Market on this
relationship. In Section III, we use estimates of the demand for beer, wine and
spirits to give some empirical content to the economic model set out in Section
II. Section IV concludes.
II. TAX RATES AND TAX REVENUES
Growing concern over cross-border shopping following the completion of the
Single Market has led to calls for UK excise duty rates to be cut. In A Real
Alternative (1994), the Brewers and Licensed Retailers Association argued that a
50 per cent reduction in the excise duty on beer would stimulate sales and
employment and would generate net revenue of more than £1 billion by 1999.
We focus on one area where there is a clear revenue consequence from cutting
tax rates — indirect tax revenues. In this section, we present a simple economic
model of the relationship between tax rates and tax revenues and consider the
effect of the Single Market on this relationship.
If cutting excise duties does reduce the volume of cross-border trade, it will
restore the tax base on which excise duties are levied, although the revenue yieldFiscal Studies
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per unit will be reduced. A key question for the exchequer, therefore, is which
effect will predominate; in other words, whether a cut in tax rates will cause
revenue to rise or to fall.
It has long been recognised that there is a non-linear relationship between tax
rates and tax revenues. Adam Smith (1776) hinted at it, and Dupuit (1844) stated
it explicitly: ‘If a tax is gradually increased from zero up to a point where it
becomes prohibitive, its yield is at first nil, then increases by small stages until it
reveals a maximum, after which it gradually declines until it becomes zero
again’.
Wherever a tax is raised, be it upon labour, capital or goods and services, the
tax base tends to disappear as companies, households and individuals seek to
minimise the incidence of the tax. In the case of goods and services, the tax base
is domestic demand and, if the law of demand holds, increases in tax rates that
are passed on to consumers as price rises will cause domestic demand to
contract. What drives the non-linear relationship between the tax rate and tax
revenues which Dupuit described is the rate at which changes in the tax rate
cause changes in the tax base (domestic demand) and hence lead to changes in
tax revenues. The key to this relationship between the tax rate and tax revenue
(and hence the key to the problem of revenue maximisation) is the own-price
elasticity of demand. This is shown formally below.
Consider the demand for a single taxable good. Denote the tax rate by !, tax
revenue by R, the quantity demanded by q and the tax-exclusive price by "; then
the tax revenue function is given by
(1) R = !"q
where q is a function of the tax-inclusive price p = "(1+!). Differentiating with
respect to the tax rate, t, we obtain
(2)
By definition, assuming !" = 0,
(3)  !p = "!!
and
(4)
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where  & is the own-price elasticity of demand of the taxed good; then, by
substitution,
(5)
Set !R/!! = 0 for a maximum, and solve for the price elasticity of demand
and the corresponding tax-inclusive price at which tax revenue is maximised
(denoted &* and p* respectively).
(6)
If demand were perfectly inelastic across the whole range of possible prices
(i.e. the quantity demanded did not respond to price changes at all), then taxes
could be increased ad infinitum without erosion of the tax base. In this case, an
increase in the tax rate will always lead to an increase in revenue and there is no
tax rate at which revenue will be maximised. If demand is responsive to price
changes, then increases in tax rates that are passed on to consumers as price rises
will cause the tax base (demand) to shrink. However, if for all price levels
demand falls by proportionately less than prices rise, there is again no limit to
the tax rates the government can introduce to increase revenues, since the tax
base will not shrink by enough to offset the increase in the tax rate per unit. For
example, for a necessary good such as bread for which demand is relatively
inelastic, tax rates could be raised very high before demand started to fall
substantially. However, in the case of other goods for which demand is more
responsive to price changes, tax revenues will decline as tax rates are raised.
These results can be shown formally from equation (5). If demand is
completely inelastic (i.e. & = 0), then the marginal change in revenue for a
marginal change in the tax rate is positive (#R/#! > 0) over the whole range of
tax rates. If, however, demand is elastic (i.e. & < –1), tax revenues decline as tax
rates are increased (#R/#!  < 0).
6
Equation (6) gives the relationship between the own-price elasticity and the
tax- inclusive and tax-exclusive prices that must hold at the point of revenue
maximisation. Note that for any positive tax rate, &* (the elasticity of demand at
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the point of revenue maximisation) must be strictly less than –1. The more
responsive demand is to price changes, the sooner tax revenues will start to
decline.
TABLE 2
Elasticity Limits
Tax-exclusive price
(pence)
Tax-inclusive price
(pence)
Elasticity limit,
&
~*
Beer 98.5 143 -3.21
Wine 146 290 -2.01
Spirits 391 1,112 -1.54
Notes: Beer is defined as bitter, bought on licensed premises, 3.9 per cent alcohol. Wine is still table wine with
less than 15 per cent alcohol. Spirits refers to whisky at 40 per cent alcohol.
Typical prices and taxes (in pence) are from HM Customs and Excise (1994, Table D1).
What would demand have to be like for the UK’s current set of alcohol excise
duties to be revenue-maximising? Suppose that taxes are revenue-maximising;
then  p = p*. Using equation (6), we can calculate the values of the current
elasticities for wine, beer and spirits (i.e. &*|p = p*) implied if the present price and
tax structure is revenue-maximising. We label these the limiting elasticities and
denote them by &
~*. Table 2 shows these limiting elasticities for beer, wine and
spirits calculated using 1993 values for the tax-inclusive and tax-exclusive
prices. The interpretation of these figures is straightforward: if the current tax
rate is revenue-maximising, then the current own-price elasticity of demand for
beer must be –3.21; for wine the current price elasticity would have to be –2.01,
and for spirits –1.54. Note that these limiting elasticities are large, particularly
for beer and wine.
If actual elasticities are not equal to their limiting values, then it follows from
equation (6) that tax rates are not set at their revenue-maximising level. It is
therefore possible to increase revenue by altering the tax rate. Equations (7a) and
(7b) give the relationship between changes in the tax rate and tax revenue
implied if actual elasticities, &, do not equal their limiting values, and hence the
direction in which the tax rates must be changed in order to increase tax revenue.
(7a)
(7b)
From equation (7a), if demand is less elastic than the limiting value, then raising
tax rates will increase revenue. From equation (7b), if demand is more elastic
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than the limiting value, however, cutting tax rates will increase revenue. For
many classes of demand curve,
7 the own-price elasticity varies according to the
point along the curve at which it is evaluated. For normal goods, if prices tend to
zero, demand tends to infinity and the elasticity tends to zero. The elasticity
tends to (minus) infinity as the price tends to infinity and the quantity demanded
tends to zero. Hence, given an estimated demand curve, we can vary prices from
their current values and move along the demand curve until the point where
equation (6) is satisfied. This is the point at which the marginal revenue response
to a marginal increase in the tax rate changes sign from negative to positive. It is
then possible to calculate the tax rate at which tax revenue is maximised. We
implement these results empirically in Section III.
So far we have looked at the relationship between tax rates and tax revenues,
and shown that it depends on the price elasticity of demand. How does the Single
European Market affect this relationship? The increased availability of close
substitutes that the Single Market has brought means that domestic consumers
have a further degree of freedom with which to respond to domestic price
changes. Before the relaxation of import restrictions, consumers could only
reduce their domestic consumption (or the quality of their consumption) in
response to a price increase; now they can maintain both quality and
consumption by shopping abroad. Therefore it is likely that one effect of the
Single Market and the increased opportunities for cross-border shopping will be
to make domestic demand for alcohol more elastic.
If opportunities for cross-border shopping do affect the elasticities for beer,
wine and spirits, the relationship between the excise duty rates and revenue
yields will change as a result. This is illustrated in Figure 1. The graph shows the
relationship between tax rates and revenues before and after the completion of
the Single European Market (SEM), assuming that there has been an increase in
the domestic demand elasticity. The result of increased opportunities for cross-
border shopping is a reduction in both the revenue-maximising tax rate
8 and the
maximum revenue yield. The increased elasticity causes the tax base of domestic
demand to erode more quickly for a given increase in tax rates and also leads to a
reduced maximum revenue yield.
As a result, if excise duties on alcohol were revenue-maximising prior to the
completion of the Single Market, any increase in the domestic elasticity in the
presence of cross-border shopping will mean that they are no longer so. This is
illustrated in the diagram. Following an increase in demand elasticity, !*(No
SEM) is no longer the revenue-maximising tax rate. At the pre-SEM tax rate,
cuts in tax rates will cause revenues to rise. !*(SEM) is the new revenue-
maximising tax rate corresponding to more elastic demand. Of course, if the
rates were not revenue- maximising before, whether or not the effect of the
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Single Market is to increase the domestic elasticity to an extent that #R/#!
changes sign is an empirical matter. In the next section, we examine this issue
further by modelling alcohol demand, and we present estimates of the own-price
elasticities of demand for beer, wine and spirits in 1992 and 1993 which are
designed to capture the effect of the Single Market. We also present evidence on
regional patterns in demand.
FIGURE 1
The Effect of the Single Market on the ! ! ! !:R Relationship
III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
In this section, we use 20 years of data from the Family Expenditure Survey
(FES)
9 (a sample of around 150,000 households) to examine some of the
theoretical issues raised in Section II. There we showed that the relationship
between tax rates and tax revenues depends on the responsiveness of demand to
price changes — the own- price elasticity of demand of a good — and that there
is a relationship between the price elasticity, final prices and tax rates that must
hold at the point at which revenue is maximised. By obtaining empirical
estimates of the domestic own-price elasticities of demand for beer, wine and
spirits and comparing them against their calculated limiting values, we can infer
whether the current tax rates are revenue- maximising, or if they are too high or
low. We also argued that unrestricted cross-border shopping will increase the
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domestic price elasticity. We can compare elasticity estimates before and after
the completion of the Single Market to assess whether the increased
opportunities for cross-border shopping have had any impact on domestic
demand responsiveness.
We estimate the own-price elasticities from single share equations of the
domestic demand for beer, wine and spirits. Following Gorman (1976), we
assume two-stage budgeting, i.e. we assume that individuals make a prior
allocation of income to broad categories of expenditure before they decide how
much to spend on individual items within these categories. We model household
expenditures on beer, wine and spirits using a generalisation of the Almost Ideal
Demand System (AIDS)
10 shown in equation (8).
(8)
For each good i, the budget share
11 (wi) is treated as a function of log real
price (lnpi), log real total household non-durable expenditure
12 (X), instrumented
by log real income,
13 and a vector of household characteristics (Zk), including
age, number of adults, number of children and number of cars. We also include a
monthly trend and cohort dummies to control for broad changes in drinking
habits over time. To capture the effect of the Single European Market, we
include a dummy variable (S) interacted with the price term (S.lnpi) and also
interact this with a dummy variable for the south-east (S.SE.lnpi), reflecting the
fact that the lower transport costs of those living near the border may make
demand more responsive. In our model, we also attempt to control for zero
shares that arise from corners, i.e. people who never consume alcohol whatever
the price, rather than infrequency of purchase. We do this by using the two-step
estimator of Heckman (1979), assuming that the proportion of females affects
the participation decision, but not the share equation, and we include the Mills
ratio (,i) in the regression equation. The full results are reported in the
Appendix.
From this model, we obtain estimates of the own-price demand elasticities for
beer, wine and spirits in 1993. These are reported in Table 3 with standard errors
and 95 per cent confidence intervals. Beer has the least elastic demand and wine
the most. Thus for any given proportional price rise, we would expect to observe
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the smallest proportional demand response for beer. By comparing these
estimates against their limiting values in Table 2, we are able to test the null
hypothesis that current excise duty rates are at their revenue-maximising level
(H0: &^ = &
~*) against the alternative that the rates are not revenue-maximising
(H1: &^ " &
~*). We report the t-statistics in Table 3. For beer and wine, we reject
the hypothesis that duties are presently at their revenue-maximising levels with a
95 per cent confidence level. For spirits, we are unable to reject the null
hypothesis.
TABLE 3
Point Elasticity Estimates
Estimates elasticity,
&^
95% confidence
interval
t-statistic
H0: &^ = &
~*
Beer -0.668 (0.238) [-1.134, -0.202] 10.68
Wine -1.396 (0.312) [-2.008, -0.784] 1.97
Spirits -1.181 (0.268) [-1.891, -0.471] 1.43
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Where we can clearly reject the null hypothesis that the current duty rates are
revenue-maximising, we want to know whether they are too high or too low from
the point of view of revenue maximisation and whether revenue could be
increased by raising or lowering taxes. For this purpose, we can use equations
(7a) and (7b). Since for both wine and beer the absolute values of the current
elasticity estimates are smaller than the absolute critical values, we can infer that
current duty rates are below their revenue-maximising level: duties could be
raised further without the rate of revenue erosion being sufficient to cause
revenues to decline nationally.
However, we can say more than simply whether current duty rates are too
high or low from the point of view of revenue maximisation. Using estimates of
the parameters of the demand curve, it is possible to find the point of revenue
maximisation at which equation (6) is satisfied for wine and spirits. It is a feature
of the particular functional form of AIDS-type models such as the one we
estimate that elasticities along the demand curve approach minus one
asymptotically from above and below. Since for our beer equation we start from
an elasticity of (absolutely) less than minus one, the absolute value of the
elasticity will never exceed minus one, however much we increase the price, and
equation (6) can never be satisfied at any point on our estimated demand curve.
For beer, we simply record that |&^| < |&
~*| and hence that current duties are lower
than their revenue-maximising levels. For wine and spirits, however, we are able
to find the point of revenue maximisation and from this we can calculate the
corresponding revenue- maximising elasticity and price level (&*, p*) and infer
the revenue-maximising tax rate (!*). The solutions are reported in Table 4. It isAlcohol Taxation and Cross-Border Shopping
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important to note that these solutions are functions of estimated parameters of
the relevant demand equation. To give an impression of the sensitivity of these
solutions to the parameter estimates they are based on, we also report (in square
brackets) the values for the revenue- maximising price and tax rate consistent
with a solution for &* one standard error either side of the point solution for &*
given in the note to the table.
We therefore calculate that the tax rate applied to wine can be increased by
40 percentage points in real terms before it becomes revenue-maximising. This
corresponds to a real increase in final prices of 20 per cent (from 290 pence to
349 pence in 1993 prices). However, two points should be noted. First, the
sensitivity of the results to the parameter estimates is clearly quite high, and it is
hard to draw firm conclusions from these figures about the exact duty rates that
should be imposed in order to maximise tax revenues. Second, the solutions are
defined relative to our assumptions about the current price of a bottle of wine
and a litre of spirits, which we take to be the ‘typical’ prices in 1993 reported by
HM Customs and Excise. Thus, assuming a higher value for the current prices,
the corresponding solutions for the revenue-maximising prices will be
proportionately higher. Nevertheless, it is clear that for spirits, the current price
lies within the interval for p*. This is, perhaps, not surprising, given that spirits
are far more heavily taxed per unit of alcohol than other alcoholic drinks, and is
consistent with our inability to reject the hypothesis that the current estimated
elasticity of demand for spirits is equal to its limiting value. The typical price for
wine lies just below the interval for p*.
TABLE 4
Revenue-Maximising Prices and Tax Rates (1993 prices)
Current
a  p, ! Maximising
b  p*, !* ! one s.e. (&*)
Wine
Prices 280p 349p [293p, 471p]
Tax rate 99% 139% [101%, 223%]
Spirits
Price 1112p 1450p [832p, 2173p]
Tax rate 184% 271% [113%, 456%]
a Source: HM Customs and Excise
b Authors’ calculation.
Note: &*: wine = -1.7199; spirits = -1.3691.
In Section II, we argued that the likely effect of the completion of the Single
Market on alcohol demand would be to increase consumer responsiveness to
changes in domestic prices, and hence to increase the own-price elasticity of
demand for beer, wine and spirits. In practice, we would expect the size of anyFiscal Studies
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change in the demand elasticity to be affected by a number of factors. The first is
the degree of substitutability between domestic and non-domestic forms of
alcohol, which may mean that the effect across the drinks market as a whole is
far from uniform. For example, we would expect the elasticity of demand for real
ales to be somewhat less affected than the demand for other forms of beer, since
non-domestic products are less direct substitutes for domestic ones. Similarly, to
the extent that alcohol bought from on- and off-licensed premises are different
goods, we would expect non-domestic products to be a much closer (legal)
substitute for the latter. We would therefore expect a greater change in the
elasticity of alcohol bought in off-licensed than on-licensed premises.
Using data from the FES, we can calculate average expenditure shares for
beer, wine and spirits by place of purchase. From 1983, expenditure on alcohol
was broken down according to whether the drinks were bought and consumed
away from home (at pubs, clubs and other on-licensed premises) or bought from
off- licensed premises and consumed at home. This breakdown is used in Figure
2.
These graphs show that pubs were facing a problem of falling demand well
before the completion of the Single Market. Although sales from licensed
premises are still far larger than those from off-licences, and this is particularly
so in the case of beer, there are signs of a shift in the late 1980s and early 1990s
away from pubs and clubs towards consuming alcohol at home. Whilst we might
expect off-licence sales to suffer more from cross-border trade as a closer
substitute for non-domestic purchases, the trend in off-licence sales has clearly
been upwards; the expenditure share on alcohol bought from off-licences
increased between 1992 and 1993, although it is not possible to tell on the basis
of these figures alone what might have happened in the absence of any Single
Market effect.
FIGURE 2
Expenditure Shares on Alcohol by Place of Purchase
Source: Family Expenditure Survey.
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Demand responsiveness will also be determined by the distribution of
household characteristics. There are many factors that will affect the extent to
which consumers will respond to price changes by shopping across borders and
that will determine the size of the change in elasticity. In general, we would
expect the response to increased opportunities for cross-border shopping to vary
with the following: the distance from the border,
14 the presence of a car and/or
van, the opportunity cost of time, the strength of individual preferences for the
domestic good over the foreign good (if there are qualitative differences between
the two), the individual’s preferred pattern of purchases and availability of credit
and hence whether the individual can make the bulk purchases necessary to
cover the fixed cost of crossing the border. To take an extreme example, we
would expect to observe the largest increases in elasticity among van-owning
unemployed residents of Dover who prefer French alcohol to English, and who
have unlimited access to credit.
To gain some idea of the effects of one of these factors — region — on the
level of cross-border shopping, we compare trends in alcohol expenditure shares
(out of total non-durable expenditure) in two regions in the UK — north
15 and
south-east
16 — using data from the FES. These are shown in Figure 3.
From these graphs, it is possible to detect broad differences in the
expenditure patterns of the two areas: alcohol comprises a larger share of non-
durable expenditure in the north than in the south-east, and beer forms a larger
proportion of alcohol spending. There is also evidence that there were divergent
trends in alcohol expenditure in the north and south-east in the late 1980s and
early 1990s: while there was an apparent fall in the size of the alcohol
expenditure share in the south-east, this was not so in the north. However, on the
basis of these figures alone, it is not possible to conclude that lower transport
costs in the south-east have meant a higher degree of cross-border shopping.
Simple data description can be interesting and informative, but it does not
allow us to disentangle the various forces at work. Using estimates of the own-
price elasticities of demand for beer, wine and spirits in 1992 and 1993,
however, we can formally test whether increased opportunities for cross-border
shopping have had any effect on the domestic elasticity. Because we are
interested in the effect of cross- border shopping, and because from the data
description it appears that the effect of cross-border shopping may be felt more
strongly in the south-east because of lower transport costs, we also estimate
demand elasticities for consumers in the south-east only. Table 5 reports the
elasticity estimates for 1992 and 1993 for the south-east and the UK as a whole
with their standard errors. Using these figures, we can test the null hypothesis
                                                                                                                                   
14 See Kanbur and Keen (1991).
15 Including Yorkshire and Humberside and the north-west.
16 Including Greater London and East Anglia.Fiscal Studies
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that there was no significant change in the elasticity for each good between 1992
and 1993. We report the t-statistics in the final column of Table 5.
FIGURE 3
Alcohol Expenditure Shares by Region
Source: Family Expenditure Survey.
For the UK as a whole, we cannot reject the hypothesis of no change in the
elasticity for beer and spirits. For wine, however, we do reject the null
hypothesis and conclude from these figures that there was a significant increase
in demand elasticity between 1992 and 1993. Comparing the estimates for the
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south-east with those for the UK as a whole, it can be seen that while the
elasticities were broadly similar prior to the Single Market in 1992, there was a
stronger increase in elasticities in the south-east for all goods between 1992 and
1993. This was particularly true for wine. Generally, the elasticities in the south-
east in 1993 are higher than those in the UK as a whole. On the basis of these
figures, it would appear that in the south-east (although not in the country as a
whole), tax revenues could be increased by cutting tax rates. However, charging
different rates of duty in different parts of the country may be practically
unfeasible and would simply have the effect of moving the border inland from
Dover.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The object of this paper was to examine the current system of alcohol taxation in
the light of what the Chancellor referred to in his last Budget Speech as ‘one of
the most widely publicised effects of the Single Market ... the increase in
legitimate cross-border shopping in alcohol’. Alcohol taxation has historically
been a major source of revenue for UK governments, but this source may be less
plentiful in the future due to cross-border shopping.
While a tax cut may restore domestic demand, it will entail a loss of revenue
per unit. The overall impact on revenue will depend on the balance between
these two effects. The relationship between tax rates and tax revenues was
explored in Section II, and we showed that the revenue response to a change in
tax rates depends on demand responsiveness. However, the Single Market is
likely to have had an effect on the relationship between tax rates and the revenue
yield: the relaxation of limits on importation for personal consumption will tend
to increase the domestic price responsiveness of the demand for alcohol. If tax
rates were revenue- maximising prior to the completion of the Single Market,
they will no longer be so following an increase in demand responsiveness. In this
case, cutting taxes will increase tax revenues.
In Section III, we used data from the Family Expenditure Survey to test some
of these theoretical results. We estimated a model of domestic demand for beer,
wine and spirits and calculated the present level of demand responsiveness for
each good. We tested whether current excise duty rates are revenue-maximising
and showed that domestic demand for beer and wine is insufficiently price-
responsive for this to be so. For spirits, we could not reject the hypothesis that
current excise duty rates are at their revenue-maximising level. We therefore
concluded that a policy of cutting tax rates on beer and wine is likely to cause
revenues to fall, although, as our estimates of the revenue-maximising duty rate
for wine showed, the scope for further real increases in duties is limited.
Finally, we tested whether the Single Market has had the anticipated effect of
increasing the responsiveness of domestic demand by comparing estimates of the
own-price demand elasticity for beer, wine and spirits in 1992 and 1993. WeFiscal Studies
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could not detect any statistically significant change in the responsiveness of
demand for beer and spirits. However, we did observe a significant increase in
the price elasticity of wine between 1992 and 1993, although this was not
sufficient to make the current excise duty rate on wine revenue-maximising. We
had prior reason to believe that the effect of the completion of the Single Market
was likely to be non- uniform across the country because of differences in
travelling costs, and, as expected, we found stronger increases in the demand
elasticities between 1992 and 1993 for the south-east than for the UK as a whole
for all goods.Alcohol Taxation and Cross-Border Shopping
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